Iran’s most powerful job is vacant for the first time in nearly four decades, and a high‑stakes struggle is under way over who will replace Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as supreme leader, a choice that will shape the future of the Islamic Republic, its nuclear program and its confrontation with the United States and Israel.
The constitution puts that decision in the hands of the conservative‑dominated Assembly of Experts, but in practice the Revolutionary Guard, rival clerical networks and street anger after Khamenei’s assassination are all pressing in on the process.
How the succession is supposed to work
Under Iran’s constitution, the supreme leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts, an 88‑member body of clerics elected to eight‑year terms but vetted heavily by hard‑line institutions. After Khamenei’s killing in a US‑Israeli strike, the country’s leadership announced that, during the transition, his duties would be carried out by a three‑man interim council: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam‑Hossein Mohseni‑Eje’i and senior cleric Alireza Arafi.
The Assembly is now meant to meet – in person, online or both – to debate and vote. It can:
- Select a single new supreme leader.
- Or, in theory, opt for a leadership council if it deems no one candidate suitable.
In practice, as Bloomberg and others note, the list has already been narrowed behind closed doors, with intense lobbying from the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) and competing clerical factions.
Mojtaba Khamenei: dynastic choice, IRGC favorite
No name looms larger, or more controversially, than Mojtaba Khamenei, the late leader’s second‑oldest son.
- At 56, Mojtaba is a mid‑ranking cleric with a reputation as a behind‑the‑scenes operator rather than a public figure.
- He reportedly fought in the Iran‑Iraq war and has long‑standing ties to the Basij militia and IRGC networks, which used force to crush the 2009 Green Movement protests.
- The US Treasury sanctioned him in 2019, saying he “represents the Supreme Leader in an official capacity despite never being elected or appointed to a government position aside from work in the office of his father.”
According to multiple reports cited by regional and Israeli outlets, the IRGC has pushed hard inside the Assembly of Experts to secure Mojtaba’s succession, seeing him as a guarantor of its political and economic power.
But there is stiff resistance. Iran’s entire post‑1979 identity is built on rejecting monarchy, and turning the supreme leadership into a hereditary post is seen by many clerics, and ordinary Iranians, as a betrayal of the revolution’s own rhetoric. Even before his death, Khamenei signaled discomfort with an explicitly dynastic hand‑over, telling confidants he did not want to create a “monarchy.”
If Mojtaba is chosen, it will underline how far the system has shifted from its ideological roots toward an IRGC‑dominated oligarchy, with religious trappings masking military power.
Ali Larijani: the pragmatist power broker
Standing in contrast is Ali Larijani, a seasoned insider often described as a pragmatic conservative.
- Larijani, 67, chairs Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, effectively managing wartime decision‑making after Khamenei’s death.
- A former parliament speaker and nuclear negotiator, he played a key role in the 2015 nuclear deal and in building long‑term strategic ties with China and Russia.
- Analysts interviewed by ABC and Reuters say he has effectively acted as an “executive president” in recent crises, coordinating responses and signaling pragmatism on nuclear talks.
Larijani does not fit the mold of a reformist. He is a product of the system, loyal to the revolution and to Khamenei’s legacy. But compared with hard‑liners around Mojtaba, he is seen as more flexible on foreign policy and economic rescue, potentially willing to seek sanctions relief in exchange for nuclear constraints.
Khamenei’s death has strengthened his hand. With Iran facing war damage, sanctions, water shortages and public anger, a portion of the elite may decide a hard‑line dynastic choice is too risky, and that Larijani offers a better chance of preserving the system through tactical compromise.
However, Larijani lacks a strong popular base and is distrusted by some radicals who fear he could dilute ideological purity in pursuit of deals with the West.
Alireza Arafi and Mohseni‑Eje’i: clerical heavyweights on the interim council
Two other prominent names already sit on the interim leadership council and inside the Assembly of Experts:
- Alireza Arafi, a senior cleric who heads Iran’s powerful network of religious seminaries and serves both on the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. As one of three interim stewards, he is well‑placed institutionally and could emerge as a consensus candidate among traditional clerics wary of both Mojtaba’s dynastic overtones and Larijani’s political baggage.
- Gholam‑Hossein Mohseni‑Eje’I, the chief justice, former intelligence minister and a long‑time insider. Eje’i is closely tied to the security apparatus and has overseen crackdowns on dissent; elevating him would signal continuity with Khamenei’s harsh domestic line.
Anadolu Agency’s explainer lists both Arafi and Mohseni‑Eje’i among six leading candidates, alongside Mojtaba Khamenei and others. Their presence at the top of the interim structure gives them visibility and networks, but also links them directly to controversial decisions taken during the current war.
Hassan Khomeini: the outsider with a famous name
On the margins of official discussions but central in reformist and diaspora conversations is Hassan Khomeini, the 52‑year‑old grandson of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
- A mid‑ranking cleric based in Qom, Hassan Khomeini has sometimes criticized hard‑line policies and was disqualified from running for office by conservative vetting bodies.
- His family name carries enormous symbolic weight, and some Iranians nostalgic for the revolution’s early promises see him as a potential bridge between Islamic legitimacy and demands for reform.
Realistically, however, the current balance of power makes his selection highly unlikely. The IRGC, Guardian Council and conservative bloc dominate the Assembly of Experts, and many of them suspect Khomeini of being too open to political liberalization.
Still, his existence as a counterfactual – a reminder that the system could, in theory, choose a different path – affects the debate and public imagination.
Other names in the mix
Analysts and news outlets point to a broader bench of potential candidates, reflecting the fluidity of the moment:
- Sadeq (Sadiq) Larijani, Ali Larijani’s brother, a hard‑line former judiciary chief and current member of the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts.
- Hassan Rouhani, former president, a centrist cleric associated with the 2015 nuclear deal, who has lost influence but retains technocratic networks.
- Hossein Noori Hamedani, an elderly ultra‑conservative marja (source of emulation) whose advanced age makes him an unlikely but symbolically significant candidate.
Before his death in a 2024 helicopter crash, Ebrahim Raisi, then president and a trusted Khamenei lieutenant – was widely seen as the frontrunner for succession. His absence has opened the field, increasing factional jockeying.
IRGC’s shadow over the Assembly of Experts
Whatever the formal process, one institution looms over the choice: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- Bloomberg reports that the Guards are using wartime emergency powers and their control over security to shape deliberations, with some Assembly members relocated or meeting under tight protection after Israeli strikes.
- Sources cited by the Jerusalem Post and Iran International say the Assembly’s proceedings have even been moved partly online after an airstrike, with IRGC‑aligned clerics pushing hard for Mojtaba Khamenei.
The Guards’ priorities are clear: preserve their vast economic holdings, maintain a confrontational regional posture, and avoid any leader who might seriously constrain their political role.
That doesn’t necessarily mean they must have Mojtaba; a deal with Larijani, Arafi or another figure is possible if their core interests are protected. But it does mean the next supreme leader is unlikely to be a genuine reformer.
What the choice means beyond Iran
For Washington, Brussels, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and Beijing, who leads Iran next will shape:
- Nuclear diplomacy: A Larijani‑type pragmatist might revive talks to restore or revise the nuclear deal, while a Mojtaba or Eje’i leadership would likely double down on expanding enrichment as a deterrent.
- Regional conflicts: Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, the Houthis, and Palestinian factions is coordinated at the supreme leader level. A harder‑line successor could escalate, while a more cautious one might recalibrate to reduce sanctions pressure.
- Energy markets: Decisions on how aggressively to defy oil sanctions, discount crude to China and Russia, or seek accommodation with the West will flow from the new leader’s strategy.
Investors watching oil prices, shipping risks in the Gulf and the broader EM debt environment will be parsing every leak and statement from Tehran’s opaque clerical conclave.
What ordinary Iranians are watching for
Inside Iran, public expectations and hopes are more basic: an end to economic free‑fall, less repression and some predictability after years of protests, sanctions and now war.
Surveys and anecdotal reporting suggest many Iranians:
- Feel little connection to the Assembly of Experts, which is seen as controlled by the same establishment that oversaw crackdowns on the 2019 fuel protests and the 2022–23 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising.
- Are skeptical that any new supreme leader will radically change course, but some see marginal differences – a Larijani‑style pragmatist might ease everyday pressure more than a Mojtaba or Eje’i.
- Worry that open power struggles could invite more foreign meddling or even internal fragmentation if IRGC factions and clerical blocs clash.
For many, the succession question boils down not to ideological labels, but to whether the next leader can secure economic breathing room and reduce the constant threat of violent confrontation, at home and abroad.
A decision that may not settle the question
When the Assembly of Experts finally announces a name – whether in days or weeks – it will not end Iran’s uncertainty. A Mojtaba appointment could deepen legitimacy crises and spur new protests. A Larijani or Arafi selection might calm some elites but leave hard‑liners restless. Any leader will govern under the long shadow of Khamenei’s tenure and the war that killed him.
For now, Iranians and the world are left reading opaque signals from Qom and Tehran, as an ageing clerical body chooses a figure who will, in theory, rule for life in a country where the ground beneath the system is shifting faster than ever.
